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The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act' (CERCLA) imposes liability for the costs of cleanup when hazardous
substances are released. CERCLA's provisions, however, do not explicitly
address the issue of institutional trustee liability. Rather, the statute defines
four categories of viable defendants (potentially responsible parties) who may
be held liable for extensive cleanup costs.2 Liability may arise under CERCLA
even if the defendant did not directly cause the release or contamination, if the
party otherwise meets the statutory definition of a "potentially responsible
party."3
Parts I through III of this article address whether an institutional trustee,
by virtue of either its actions or mere status as a trustee of contaminated
property, can be deemed a CERCLA responsible party and be held liable for
CERCLA remediation costs in its individual capacity. Part IV reviews potential
exemptions from, or defenses to, liability. Because little authority directly
addressing CERCLA liability for institutional trustees exists and the current
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1. CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. CERCLA § 107(a)(1-4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4).
3. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (construing
CERCLA § 9607(a)(1) to impose liability on current owner without regard to causation).
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case law in the few analogous areas is in flux, this article will examine case law
relating to trustees generally as well as instances in which institutional trustees
have been explicitly involved in CERCLA liability claims.
I. POTENTIAL TRUSTEE LIABILITY
The cost of cleaning up contaminated property held in trust can sometimes
far exceed the value of the trust property itself.4 In such instances, the
government or a private-party plaintiff will seek to identify another private
source of funding for the remediation of the site. Such sources often include
parties identified as "deep pockets."5  Thus, institutional trustees are
particularly attractive targets for plaintiffs seeking to extend CERCLA liability
to parties able to pay for the cleanup.
CERCLA lists four classes of potentially responsible parties who may be
held liable for remediation of a contaminated site: (1) current "owners or
operators" of contaminated property; (2) "owners or operators" of the property
at the time hazardous substances were disposed of; (3) persons who "arranged
for disposal or treatment" of hazardous substances; and (4) persons who
accepted the substances for transport.6 This broad language has swept many
parties into the statute's coverage. Passive landlords or landowners who lease
property contaminated by tenants' activities, for example, may be liable as
owners.7 Persons who can control activities affecting hazardous substance
releases may also be liable as operators.' Most importantly for the purposes
of this article, current owners of contaminated property may be held liable
solely by virtue of their ownership status, without a requirement that the
plaintiff show the owner knew of, caused, or contributed to the release or
contamination.'
Accordingly, the first consideration in examining whether institutional
trustees may be individually liable beyond the trust's assets for CERCLA
4. These costs include attendant costs such as Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
oversight costs or enforcement costs. Such costs are recoverable by the government under
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A) and potentially by private parties under § 107(a)(4)(B). Compare
Stanton Road Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., No. 91-15729, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1272, at *2 (9th
Cir. Jan. 28, 1993) (attorneys' fees not recoverable in private cost recovery action), with General
Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1421-22 (8th Cir. 1990)
(attorneys' fees recoverable as "necessary costs of response" in private cost recovery action), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991). These are the only two federal circuit courts to consider this issue.
5. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Garbage Serv. Co., No. 89-1709SC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1406
(D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 1993). See also discussion infra Part II.B.
6. CERCLA § 107(a)(1-4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,168-69 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
8. See, e-g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
847-49 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); but see
General Elec. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 285-87 (2d Cir. 1992).
9. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
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remediation costs is whether a trustee may be an owner or operator within the
meaning of CERCLA. Thus, one must determine whether trustees' fiduciary
relationships or management actions as trustees can be construed as a form of
ownership or operation" that gives rise to CERCLA liability.1' Trustees
hold title to property in most states.' Further, typical trustee responsibilities
may require the trustee to manage, develop, organize or disburse assets in ways
that involve "operations" of property. 3 Thus, for trustees, there appears to
be a potential liability risk as an owner or operator under CERCLA.
II. TRUSTEES AS "OWNERS"
The courts have not limited the class of potentially liable owners under
CERCLA to those holding title to property. For example, a recent case, United
States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc.,4 found Marine Midland Bank,
which acted as a lessee-sublessor, liable as an owner for exercising a degree of
site control that the court considered sufficient to confer ownership status. 5
The bank had the right under its lease to sublet the property, evict tenants,
determine use of the property by tenants, collect rents, and enforce tenant
obligations. 6 The bank also took responsibility for property maintenance and
repair. 7 Though the bank did not have the power of "alienation," the A &
N Cleaners court, relying on an earlier case, found that the lessee-sublessor
bank enjoyed the rights and obligations of an owner.'"
Another recent CERCLA case found that passage of equitable title was
sufficient to impose owner liability. 9 The court ruled that a party who had
10. CERCLA defines the term "owner or operator" to mean, in part:
in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating
such facility, and ... in the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed
due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a
unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise
controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (emphasis added).
11. Trustee liability will most likely be affected by the way "owners" or "operators" are
interpreted to be liable under CERCLA. Theoretically, certain trustee management activities
could constitute "arrangement for disposal" if, for example, a trustee assumed operational control
of waste containers. As discussed below, however, if such action were a basis for liability, it
would probably be as a form of "operator liability." It is unlikely that a trustee would incur
liability as a transporter. See also infra Part III.
12. See I WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 2.6 (4th ed. 1987).
13. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 16227 (West 1991).
14. 788 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
15. Id. at 1330-34.
16. Id. at 1333-34.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1332 (quoting United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1985), affid in part and vacated in part sub nom. United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), and cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989)).
19. United States v. Wedzeb Enters., Inc., No. 90-1877C, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19494, at
1993]
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entered into a contract to purchase a contaminated site but had paid only a
small fraction of the purchase price and had not yet received a deed, was an
owner under CERCLA because "under Indiana law, 'when the parties enter
into [a land sale] contract, all incidents of ownership accrue to the vendee. The
vendee assumes the risk of loss and is the recipient of all appreciation in
value.'
, 2 °
Thus, a question may arise regarding whether institutional trustees, either
as title holders to property in trust, or by virtue of their activities in leasing or
otherwise managing such property, may be deemed owners who can incur
individual liability for CERCLA response costs outside the corpus of a trust.
Four cases have directly addressed this question.
A. U.S. v. Burns,2 Premium Plastics,' and Petersen Sand & Gravef3
Until recently, the trend in the case law seemed to indicate that holding
mere title and exercising common fiduciary obligations were not sufficient to
render an institutional trustee liable as an owner. Rather, more involvement,
such as that which applies also to a trust beneficiary, was necessary to create
owner liability. This trend is evident in the Bums, Premium Plastics, and
Petersen Sand & Gravel cases.
In United States v. Bums, the United States brought an action pursuant to
section 107 of CERCLA to recover cleanup costs it incurred in response to the
release or threatened release of hazardous substances on two sites.24 Among
the defendants named was Raymond Crowley, who was both a trustee
(although not an institutional trustee) and a beneficiary of a realty trust
containing one of the sites at issue.' Crowley filed a motion to dismiss the
action, asserting that he never owned the land subject to the action and that he
had never personally participated in activities subject to CERCLA liability.26
The District Court denied Crowley's motion to dismiss.27
The language used by the Northern District of New Hampshire in denying
Crowley's motion initially appears to interpret CERCLA broadly regarding
trustee ownership liability. The court began by stating that "as trustee, Crowley
held legal title to the trust property and under trust law could be liable for
*17 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 9, 1992).
20. Id. at *16 (quoting Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Ind. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 921 (1974) (citation omitted)).
21. United States v. Bums, No. 88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340 (D.N.H. Sept. 12,
1988).
22. Premium Plastics, Inc. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, No. 92 C 413,1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119
(N.D. I. Oct. 21, 1992).
23. United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
24. Burns, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *5.
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obligations as the owner of the property."'28 The court continued by asserting
that "[a]s an owner, Crowley would be liable for response costs regardless of
whether he personally participated in conduct that violated CERCLA. An
owner is liable without being an operator of the facility."'29
The court's language, standing alone, appears to allow imposition of
liability merely because, as trustee, Crowley held legal title to the contaminated
property. However, the opinion is replete with references to Crowley's dual
capacity as trustee and beneficiary. After describing Crowley as "sole trustee
and beneficiary" of the trust, the court framed the primary issue to be decided
as "whether Crowley, as trustee and beneficiary .... can be considered an
owner or operator of the ... site."'" Among other things, the court cited the
fact that lessees have been considered owners for CERCLA purposes, and then
concluded that "Crowley, as trustee and beneficiary of the... trust, was as
much an 'owner' of the ... trust as would be a lessee."'"
The briefs and memoranda filed by the United States emphasized the
significance of Crowley's dual role as both trustee and beneficiary of the trust.
The government argued that the trust:
was a device through which Raymond Crowley as trustee held legal title and
full authority to manage the ... Site for the benefit of Raymond Crowley, who
held equitable title as one of the Trust's beneficiaries .... Mr. Crowley thus
held all elements and rights of ownership in the ... Site, as surely as if he [and
the original co-trustee] had simply purchased the Site as individual joint
tenants.32
The government also argued that the trustee/beneficiary "essentially used the
Trust's accounts as a personal check book, depositing and withdrawing funds
virtually at will."33
The government's emphasis on the defendant's trustee/beneficiary status
is perhaps clearest in its argument that Crowley was properly named as an
individual in the suit because, as trustee and beneficiary, he, not the trust, was
the true owner of the property for purposes of CERCLA liability.34 The
28. Id. at *4 (citing IIn ScoTr ON TRUSTS §§ 265, 265.1 (3d ed. 1985)). The fourth edition
states that "today a trustee is personally liable on obligations imposed upon him as holder of the
legal title to the trust property, as for taxes, assessments... and certain other obligations, unless
it is otherwise provided by statute." III-A WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 265 (4th
ed. 1988).
29. Burns, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *5 (citations omitted).
30. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
32. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Liability Against Defendant Raymond Crowley, at 4, Burns, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340
(emphasis added) (source obtainable through authors).
33. Trial Brief of the United States, at 2, Burns, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340 (source
obtainable through authors).
34. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Crowley's Motion to Dismiss, at 2-3,
Burns, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340 (source obtainable through authors).
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government further argued that "[i]t would defeat the strict liability scheme of
CERCLA if an owner such as defendant Crowley could escape liability simply
by having owned property through the device of a trust where he is both a
beneficiary and a trustee."35 The Burns court echoed the idea that CERCLA
should not let potentially responsible parties hide behind indirect ownership
schemes, when it stated that "Congress did not intend for a responsible party
to be able to avoid liability through the use of a trust or other forms of
ownership."36 Thus, it is clear that the Burns decision rests, at least in part,
upon the defendant trustee's status as beneficiary.
Two recent cases, both in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, relied on state trust law in determining that an Illinois land trustee is
not an owner for the purposes of CERCLA, reinforcing the analysis presented
in Burns.37 The Northern District of Illinois explained that an Illinois land
trust is an "odd legal creature."3 Under such a trust, the trustee holds both
legal and equitable title with limited responsibilities. Indeed, the "trustee's
sole duty... is to hold and dispose of legal title at the written direction of the
beneficiaries."4
Citing the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in People v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co.,41 the court in Premium Plastics, Inc. v. Lasalle Nat'l Bank held that
the beneficiary, not the trustee, was the owner of the land held in trust, for
purposes of triggering cleanup liability.42 The court elaborated that:
Since [the beneficiary] must be considered the owner of the Site for the
purposes of this lawsuit, plaintiffs need not fear that they will be left with no
defendant to specify as owner. Moreover, this court will not subject an
innocent party such as [the land trustee] to liability in order to assure that
plaintiffs have a source of recovery for their expenses related to this matter.43
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant, La Salle National
Bank, acting as trustee."
35. Id.
36. Burns, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *4 (citation omitted).
37. Premium Plastics, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119; Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp.
1346.
38. Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. at 1358.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 389 N.E.2d 540,545 (Ill. 1979) ("[T]here is not a single attribute of ownership, except title,
which does not rest in the beneficiary .... The land trustee is, in fact, a fiction which has
become entrenched in the law of this State and accepted as a useful instrument in the handling
of real estate transactions").
42. Premium Plastics, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119, at *11-12. Plaintiff's motion-based on
other issues-to reconsider the October 21, 1992, order of the court was subsequently denied.
Premium Plastics Inc. v. Lake Shore Nat'l Bank, No. 92 C 413, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19787,
(N.D. I11. Dec. 23, 1992).
43. Premium Plastics, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119, at *11-12.
44. Id. at *12.
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In Petersen Sand & Gravel, the Northern District of Illinois again employed
the Burns analysis in determining whether an Illinois land trustee was an owner
for the purposes of CERCLA liability. Again citing Chicago Title, the court
stated that "it is the beneficiary who bears the burden of land ownership under
Illinois laws, not the trustee."45 The Petersen Sand & Gravel court buttressed
this conclusion with the following policy argument:
Concluding that an Illinois land trustee is an "owner" would not promote the
goals of CERCLA. While this conclusion would provide an extraordinarily
deep pocket-here, [the land trustee] made under $2,000 for being trustee for
more than 20 years, but CERCLA could impose over $800,000 in liability-it
would not serve CERCLA's primary goal of making those who are responsible
for or who benefitted from environmental damage foot the bill. Whereas
Congress might have made owners strictly liable because ownership is generally
a good proxy for responsibility, paper ownership like that of an Illinois land
trustee is wholly unrelated to responsibility.1 6
Based on this review of CERCLA's purposes, the features of Illinois land trusts,
and concepts of ownership under federal and state law, the court granted
summary judgment for Northern Trust Co. and found the trustee was not liable
under CERCLA as a matter of law.47
B. City of Phoenix v. Garbage Service Co.4'
The fourth case addressing trustee liability, Phoenix v. Garbage Service Co.,
involved an institutional trustee in a more traditional fiduciary arrangement.
The District Court of Arizona has issued two rulings in the case, Phoenix I and
Phoenix I. 9 The rulings appear to draw conclusions significantly counter to
those in Burns, Premium Plastics, and Petersen Sand & Gravel.
The Phoenix 11 court described the facts of the case as follows. Valley
National Bank (Valley), acting as trustee of a testamentary trust, exercised an
option to purchase a landfill in 1966.50 A warranty deed conveyed the
property to the bank as "trustee."'" The bank continued to lease the site to
Garbage Service Company, a company that had managed and administered the
landfill and continued to do so for the next six years.52 After this time, the
bank closed the landfill and left the site unused.53 Throughout and after the
45. Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. at 1358.
46. Id. at 1359 (citation omitted).
47. Id.
48. City of Phoenix v. Garbage Serv. Co., No. 89-1709SC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1406 (D.
Ariz. Jan. 19, 1993) (Phoenix 11), and 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1655 (D. Ariz. 1991)
(Phoenix 1).
49. Id.
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six years, the bank obtained liability insurance for the landfill and paid its
property taxes. 4
In 1980, the City of Phoenix began condemnation proceedings. Through
these proceedings, the city eventually acquired the landfill and the
condemnation judgment declared the bank, as trustee, record owner of the
site." In 1989, the City of Phoenix sued the bank to recover response costs
incurred by the city in cleaning up the contaminated landfill. 6
In Phoenix I, Judge Rosenblatt held that Valley, as the institutional trustee,
could not be held liable under CERCLA without evidence of ownership in
addition to a warranty deed that conveyed a landfill to Valley. 7 On a motion
to reconsider by the plaintiff in Phoenix II, Judge Conti held that a trustee is
an owner for purposes of CERCLA even if it only holds bare legal title. 8 The
court explained that the two holdings were not inconsistent, but to the extent
the earlier ruling was unclear, the plaintiff's motion to reconsider was
granted. 9 The Phoenix II court did not specifically rule on the question of
whether a liable trustee would be obligated beyond the value of the trust's
assets, and it was reported from the bench that Judge Conti invited briefing on
this issue.'
The Phoenix 1I court framed the issue as "whether a trustee, as the holder
of legal title to property, may be held liable under CERCLA for cleanup costs
as an 'owner' even though he played no role in the contamination of the
property."'" At the outset of its analysis, the court noted that there is no
culpability requirement for ownership liability under CERCLA. 2 The court
then cited the legislative history for the proposition that "any titleholder is an
'owner' under [CERCLA]" and claimed that "commentators uniformly agree
that the term 'owner' under CERCLA includes trustees who hold legal title
only."63 As further evidence of Congress's intent that the term owner have
the broadest possible meaning, the court noted that Congress carved out a
single exception to titleholder liability for "lenders who hold 'indicia of
ownership primarily to protect [their] security interest. ' '
The bank pointed to a proposed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
rule that would not impose CERCLA liability on innocent trustees or
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *2-3.
57. Phoenix 1, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1656.
58. Phoenix 11, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1406, at *10.
59. Id. at *10 n.3.
60. Transcript of Status Hearing at 3:24-4:1, 14:8-14:11, 14:16-14:18, Phoenix 11, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1406 (source obtainable through authors).
61. Phoenix II, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1406, at *6.
62. Id. at *6-7.
63. Id. at *7-8.
64. Id. at *8 (quoting CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)).
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fiduciaries.' However, the court rejected this argument, finding that the EPA
proposal dealt only with secured creditor liability.66 Thus, the proposed rule
only applied to trustees that were also secured creditors.67 As evidence of
EPA's intent, the court cited Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Horman Family Trust.68
In that case, EPA issued formal notice to three different defendants, including
a trustee, that they may be liable for CERCLA response costs as potentially
responsible parties.69
Finally, the Phoenix 11 court relied on its interpretation of Burns in holding
that "a trustee is an 'owner' for the purposes of Section 107 of CERCLA, even
though the trustee may hold only bare legal title."7 The court elaborated:
It may seem unjust to subject trustees that are not involved in the
contamination of the property to liability for cleanup that, in some cases, may
far exceed the value of the trust's assets. But ... a defendant's degree of
culpability has nothing to do with owner/operator liability under CERCLA.
If Congress had meant to exempt uninvolved trustees from liability as 'owners'
under CERCLA, it would have said so in the statute.7'
In reaching its conclusion, the District Court of Arizona chose to focus on
the fact that the Burns court did not disregard the trust entity entirely, even
though the defendant was a beneficiary.7' Rather, it emphasized that the
defendant trustee in Burns held legal title to the property.' As such, the
trustee could be held liable for cleanup costs as the owner under trust law.74
Another court presented with the issue of trustee liability under CERCLA
failed to address it. In Quadion Corp. v. Mache,75 Quadion's predecessor-in-
interest purchased the shares of a corporation from an individual and a trust.
76
After its purchase, however, Quadion learned that the corporation's property
was severely contaminated and sought to cleanup the site.77 Quadion then
sued several parties to recover its costs, including the individual, the trust and
65. Id. at *9.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 960 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1992).
69. Id. at 921.
70. Phoenix 1I, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1406, at *10. This holding appears to be inconsistent
with the ruling in Phoenix I that "[n]o liability attaches to [the bank] solely by virtue of the
warranty deed conveying the landfill to [the bank], as trustee." Phoenix 1, 33 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) at 1656.
71. Phoenix HI, 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1406, at *10.
72. Id. at *9.
73. Id at *9-10.
74. Id. (quoting United States v. Burns, No. 88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *4
(D.N.H. Sept. 12, 1988), citing I ScoTr ON TRUSTS §§ 265, 265.1 (3d ed. 1985)).
75. 738 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. IM. 1990), summary judgment granted in part, summary judgment
denied in part, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8222 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1991).
76. Id. at 273.
77. Id.
1993]
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its beneficiaries, the trustee at the time of the sale, and the successor
trustees." Among other things, the lawsuit alleged that the trustees were
owners or operators of the contaminated property under CERCLA.79 In the
context of the plaintiff's claim that the trustees failed to disclose a latent defect,
the court noted that under Illinois law, a successor trustee is not liable for acts
of a predecessor trustee." However, without explanation, the court refused
to dismiss the CERCLA claim against the successor trustees."'
III. TRUSTEES AS "OPERATORS"
Even though no court has yet found an institutional trustee liable as an
operator under CERCLA, institutional trustees may face potential liability as
operators in their capacity as landlords or property managers. In Phoenix 11,
the court did not find the trustee liable as an operator but, as discussed above,
did find the trustee liable as an owner.' In that case, the plaintiff, City of
Phoenix, argued that the defendant's status as trustee over property used as a
landfill gave it "authority to control" the cause of contamination, making it
liable as an operator under CERCLA.' The Phoenix II court held, however,
that because the defendant trustee was not involved in the day-to-day
administration of the contaminated landfill property, the trustee had no liability
as an operator under CERCLA. 4 As grounds for reaching its decision, the
court specifically mentioned the following facts: (1) the trustee "did not enter
into or negotiate contracts for the disposal of wastes at the landfill"; (2) the
trustee "did not know the identity or the nature of [the landfill's] customers";
and (3) the trustee's "communication with [landfill] personnel was limited to
matters involving [the] estate, such as tax questions, and not the operation of
the [1landfill." '85
Although the activities described in Phoenix 11 did not give rise to operator
liability, other trust management activities may create CERCLA operator
liability for institutional trustees. This potential risk can be examined by
analogy to other classes of liable parties. For example, if an institutional trustee
holding real property in trust was involved in leasing the property to industrial
tenants, a court might treat the trustee as it could a landlord. Such a role
creates potential CERCLA liability.8'
78. Id. at 270.
79. Id. at 274.
80. Id. at 275.
81. Id. at 274.
82. Phoenix II, No. 89-1709SC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1406, at *6-10 (D. Ariz. Jan. 19,1993).
83. Id. at *4-5 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d
1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992)) ("'operator' liability under [CERCLA] only attaches if the defendant
had [the] authority to control the cause of the contamination at the time the hazardous substances
[are] released into the environment").
84. Id. at *6.
85.Id.
86. Nurad, Inc. v. Win. E. Hooper & Sons Co., 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20079
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Landlords may be held liable as operators with or without direct
management of the property. The Federal District Court of Maryland held a
landlord liable when he routinely participated in and controlled property
management decisions relating to a site. 7 However, landlords may also be
held liable without such active participation. For instance, in United States v.
Monsanto Co., the court held that an absentee landlord could not assert a
defense to liability despite its ignorance of disposal activities on the property,
because CERCLA "does not sanction such willful or negligent blindness on the
part of absentee owners. "'
Trustees often take actions with respect to trust property that the cases
noted above have found to constitute operations. 9 In fact, the fiduciary duties
imposed on trustees may make it difficult for them to limit their roles and
potential liability because, as fiduciaries, they cannot abstain from all
involvement with the property. In many states, a "trustee has a duty not to
delegate to others the performance of acts that the trustee can reasonably be
required personally to perform .. . ."" This duty may keep trustees involved
in property management issues, consequently opening them to allegations of
owner or operator liability.
Similarly, many states require trustees to make trust property productive.9
In order to fulfill this duty, trustees may have to become involved in difficult
decisions, including those regarding hazardous substances, if such decisions
could affect the value of the property. While becoming involved in such
decisions could open trustees to allegations of operator liability, failure to
become involved may subject them to liability for breaching fiduciary duties
created by trust law. 2
(D. Md. 1991), affd in part and rev'd in part, 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992), and cert. denied sub
nom. Mumaw v. Nurad, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
87. Id. at 20084.
88. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1106 (1989).
89. See e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 16227 (West 1991).
90. Id. at § 16012.
91. See, e.g., Id. at § 16007.
92. Trustees have expressed some concern that, by their mere ability or authority to control
disposal activities, they may fall under CERCLA's coverage as an "arranger of disposal." Under
this theory, a trustee could face liability even without participating in disposal decisions, as long
as the trustee had power to participate in those decisions. However, the Second Circuit recently
rejected this argument in General Elec. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281 (2d Cir.
1992). In that case, three oil companies were sued on the theory that, because they had the
ability to direct individual dealers in waste disposal decisions, they should be liable under
CERCLA even if they never actually participated in disposal decisions. The court, however, held
that the mere capacity to direct or control the disposal of hazardous waste does not give rise to
"arranger" liability under CERCLA. Id. at 286.
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IV. EXEMPTIONS, DEFENSES AND TENUOUS THREADS
Certain exemptions or defenses may be available to trustees either under
CERCLA itself or pursuant to state trust laws. However, these exemptions and
defenses are limited in scope.
A. EPA Interpretation
EPA recently promulgated its final rule interpreting the scope of
CERCLA's secured lender exemption.93 Because institutional trustees do not
hold title for the purpose of protecting a security interest, they do not appear
to be covered by any of the rule's provisions. Nevertheless, EPA took the
opportunity in its rulemaking preamble to comment on the concerns of lending
institutions acting as trustees. The preamble to the lender liability rule offers
the following gratuitous statement:
The assumption of several commenters-that a trustee is personally liable
under CERCLA solely because a trust asset is contaminated, even if the trustee
had no knowledge of the asset's contamination and was in no way involved in
the activities that resulted in the contamination-is incorrect. No case has so
held, and no commenter cited any principle of law that would command this
result. A trustee is not personally liable for CERCLA cleanup costs solely
because a trust asset is contaminated by hazardous substances.94
Thus, EPA has declined to state affirmatively that trustees have personal (or
corporate) liability beyond the trust assets. However, it is unclear what effect,
if any, EPA's language will have on suits to recover cleanup costs under
CERCLA.
B. CERCLA Defenses
CERCLA provides institutional trustees with two possible defenses should
liability for response costs be asserted against them. The "innocent purchaser"
and the "acquisition by bequest or inheritance" defenses apply to trustees who
meet their narrow qualifications." However, both defenses are limited in
important respects.
1. Innocent Purchaser
CERCLA exempts an otherwise liable party from liability if the party can
establish that it had "undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate
93. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability
Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. at 300). "CERCLA
section 101(20)(A) exempts persons whose indicia of ownership in a facility are held primarily
to protect a security interest, provided that they do not participate in the management of the
facility." Id.
94. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,349 (emphasis added).
95. See CERCLA §§ 101(35)(A), 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3).
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inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with
good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability," and
yet did not know of the contamination. 96 While this defense appears to reduce
the risk of liability for many trustees, applying the defense to trustees may be
problematic. There has been no judicial consideration of what constitutes the
"customary practice" of investigation by an institutional trustee before taking
title. Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty regarding whether a trustee
has the same right and ability to investigate property prior to entering a trust
relationship that an ordinary buyer enjoys before acquisition. Absent clear
limitations or prohibitions on institutional trustees' ability to investigate, EPA
and the courts may require a fairly high degree of diligence by institutional
trustees wishing to benefit from this exemption. Furthermore, institutional
trustees may carry the burden to demonstrate all necessary elements of the
innocent purchaser defense.
2. Inheritance or Bequest
If the trust holding contaminated property came into being as a
testamentary trust at the death of the settlor, the trustee may be able to assert
the acquisition of the trust property by inheritance or bequest as a defense."
For example, in one case the district court held that five defendants who
inherited stock in a contaminated facility and became owners of the facility
when the corporation was dissolved were not liable under CERCLA because
the transfer of ownership was more like an inheritance than a private
transaction."
To take advantage of the innocent purchaser or inheritance/bequest
defenses, the institutional trustee must show: (1) that the property was
contaminated at the time it came into the trust,99 and (2) that the trustee
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned.' This
due care requirement could raise questions regarding the scope of the trustee's
obligations to initiate cleanup or containment of the hazardous substances at its
own expense once the contamination is identified, particularly if the trust assets
are inadequate to pay for such costs.
C. Defenses Under State Trust Law
When the question of personal trustee liability beyond the corpus of the
trust is finally examined by a court, protection from CERCLA liability may be
found in existing state trust law concepts. Many states have codified provisions
of the Uniform Probate Code, which limits a trustee's personal liability to
96. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
97. CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(iii).
98. United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341,1348 (D. Idaho 1989).
99. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
100. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
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intentional or negligent acts by the trustee."' The Uniform Probate Code
states: "A trustee is personally liable for obligations arising from ownership or
control of [trust] property ... only if [the trustee] is personally at fault."'"
For a trustee defendant to prevail with this argument, federal courts must
incorporate state trust law concepts in fashioning a federal rule of decision to
define trustee liability under CERCLA. In Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music,
Ltd.,1°  the court considered whether Congress intended federal courts to
develop uniform federal rules of decision that would incorporate state law to
decide which types of settlement or indemnification agreements would be
recognized under section 107(e)(1) of CERCLA.Y While the court noted
that federal law governed the issue, it emphasized that it must determine
whether state law should be incorporated to provide the content of the federal
rule. 5 The Mardan court considered the following factors: "(1) whether the
issue requires 'a nationally uniform body of law'; (2) whether 'application of
state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs'; and
(3) whether 'application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial
relationships predicated on state law."" 0 6
An analysis similar to that used in Mardan could be used to determine the
application of CERCLA owner liability to institutional trustees. Although the
CERCLA rule of strict liability for owners guides any liability rationale, it can
be argued that it is appropriate for federal courts to look to state trust law for
guidance as to whether the term "owners" should be interpreted to encompass
trustees personally. Because it is an important policy under state law that
trustees be held personally liable only for negligent or intentional acts, it can
be argued that trustees should not be deemed subject to CERCLA simply
because of their status and relation to the trust property.
The application of a federal rule imposing strict liability on trustees by
virtue of their ownership or operator status may disrupt existing commercial
relationships predicated on state trust law. Although exempting trustees from
strict liability as owners limits the class of potentially liable parties under
CERCLA, this fact alone does not demonstrate that the state law rule frustrates
the specific objectives of CERCLA. Obviously, Congress intended that there
be limits to the scope of potentially liable parties.0 7 Further, CERCLA
101. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 18001 (West 1991).
102. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 7-306(b), 8 U.L.A. 560 (1983).
103. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
104. Id. at 1457-58.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1458 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979)).
107. See, e.g., Edward Hins Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155,157 (7th Cir.
1988) ("To the point that courts could achieve 'more' of the legislative objectives by adding to
the lists of those responsible, it is enough to respond that statutes have not only ends but also
limits. Born of compromise, laws such as CERCLA and SARA do not pursue their ends to their
logical limits. A court's job is to find and enforce stopping points no less than to implement
other legislative choices." (citation omitted)).
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owner liability for trustees does not seem to require a nationally uniform body
of law. This is particularly true because some states have unique trust
arrangements, such as the Illinois land trustee, that demand consideration of
state trust law provisions granting trustees certain protections from personal
liability.108
CONCLUSIONS
Professional trustees now face uncertainty concerning their status as
potentially liable parties under CERCLA. Given the considerable uncertainties
in the general case law and the Phoenix precedent, trustees must attempt to
avoid liability based on the little information available. A trustee should
carefully monitor operation of the property held in trust so as to diminish the
chance of a release of hazardous substances and the corresponding possibility
of owner/operator liability. In addition, it may be advisable to include a
provision in all leases requiring tenants to comply with environmental laws.
In order to assert the innocent landowner or inheritance defense under
CERCLA, a trustee should thoroughly investigate property before acquisition
or prior to accepting a trusteeship. It is also advisable to perform pre-
acquisition environmental assessments or investigations of property once a trust
is operational.
Finally, a trustee may seek to include language in trust agreements
requiring settlors to indemnify the trustee in the case of environmental liability,
or requiring other trust assets to be available for cleanup costs and for trustee
indemnification. Of course, such provisions will be meaningful only to the
extent that the settlor or the trust possesses assets sufficient to cover such costs.
108. The argument that trustees should not be subject to CERCLA's strict liability standard
as owners has gained support with regard to bankruptcy trustees. A federal bankruptcy court
recently ruled that receivers appointed by state courts may never be held personally liable for
cleanup costs incurred under CERCLA as a result of their receivership activities, because they
are agents of state judges, who enjoy judicial immunity. In re Sundance Corp., No. 88-01246-R41,
1993 Bankr. LEXIS 46, at *10 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 1993). See also Wisconsin v. Better
Brite Plating, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 574 (Wisc. 1992)(holding that a violation of state law does not
automatically mean a trustee acted outside its scope of authority).
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